Public majorities have supported several gay rights policies for some time, yet Congress's response has been limited. We document and analyze this tension through dyadic analysis of the opinion-vote relationship on 23 roll-calls between 1993 and 2010, revealing a nuanced picture of responsiveness and incongruence. While opinion influences white male Democrats, black lawmakers and white female Democratic lawmakers generally support gay rights and Republicans consistently oppose them, regardless of constituent preferences. Moreover, changes in constituent opinion typically fail to engender vote changes. This analysis suggests a mix of member persuasion and replacement may be necessary to achieve LGB rights gains in Congress. Word count: 6426
Introduction
Scholars have long argued that public opinion and policy dance together. Changes in public preferences incite changes to government policy, and opinion tends to reflect the state of policy (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Monroe 1998) . The potential to achieve civil rights gains through the legislative process is therefore thought to depend in part on cultivating public support. A rise in public favor, especially when combined with high issue salience, can increase civil rights advocates' leverage in the policy process, opening opportunities for reform (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998; Lee 2002 ).
However, public support for lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) rights seems to have trotted past federal policy over the past two decades (even as critics claim federal policy is ahead of the beat). Polls show Americans favor a variety of legal protections for LGB individuals, many of which remain elusive (Egan and Sherrill 2005; Brewer 2008 ). Our measures of subnational opinion show this is not simply a faulty ecological inference from national trends. Despite majority public support in all states and nearly every House district, for example, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) has yet to pass both chambers of Congress (peek ahead to FIGURE 3).
Given the extension of certain rights, through the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) and the adoption of federal hate crimes legislation, it does not appear that the liberalization of opinion on LGB issues has completely failed to affect the legislative process. It does seem, however, that the public's influence may be minor. Even for these few successes, there has been a significant lag between opinion change and policy change. Large national majorities have favored treating violent acts against gays and lesbians as hate crimes since the high-profile murder of Matthew Shepard in 1998; yet, Congress did not enact hate crimes legislation until 2009. Moreover, the margin of support has been much smaller in Congress than among the public (e.g., see the gap between public and Congressional support for the repeal of DADT in FIGURE   3 ). In this light, while the continuing liberalization of opinion on LGB rights receives a great deal of popular attention, it is difficult to gauge what kind of Congressional response-if any-we should expect to see. To better understand the potential for gains in public support to engender real policy gains, we need to know not only whether, but to what extent public opinion incentivizes support from different types of legislators in roll-call votes on LGB issues.
Hence, we study the match and mismatch between opinion and policy on LGB rights, engaging in a deep descriptive case study tied to larger theoretical questions about the role of public opinion in the political process. We develop new tools and approaches to interrogate the relationship between public preferences and congressional action on LGB rights. Specifically, we analyze roll-call votes on all five major gay rights issues addressed by Congress from the early 1990s to the present: same-sex marriage, adoption, hate crimes, employment non-discrimination, and military service. Using an extension of multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) developed for this project, we estimate opinion on each of these issues over time by state and congressional district, and then consider the extent to which constituent preferences seem to affect the votes of members of Congress (MCs).
Of course, a case study in one area cannot answer all questions of democratic representation; but, our findings should lead to a more nuanced understanding of the power and limits of majority will, especially when put in context of similar work to be done in other areas.
To this end, the MRP extension we present herein expands the range of surveys that can be used to estimate district opinion to study responsiveness. Moreover, this is no minor case study. These policy decisions affect the lives of millions of Americans, and have come to play a big part in the "culture wars" shaping much political conflict in the United States over the past few decades.
This case study also contributes to the longstanding debate over the relative roles of top-down and bottom-up forces in producing civil rights gains, and speaks to the appropriate standard of review for LGB rights in federal courts.
We are not the first to study this policy area or to relate roll-call voting to constituent opinion (cf., Haider-Markel 1999 , 2001 Lewis and Edelson 2000) . Our measures of constituent preferences, however, place public opinion and roll-call votes on the same metric, expanding the inferences we can draw. Also, because our analysis spans two decades, we can compare votes cast by the same MCs on the same issues and bills over time, offering additional causal leverage on the opinion-vote relationship. We can evaluate to what extent "evolution" on these issues is possible, and to what extent actual turnover of legislators would be needed to see policy change.
Finally, we consider the possibility that responsiveness could vary across lawmakers. On the one hand, ideological commitment and/or party loyalty could inhibit Republicans' responsiveness to a liberal opinion trend. On the other, MCs who are members of groups that have historically faced discrimination (e.g., African-Americans, women) may be inclined to follow the kind of anti-majoritarian minority rights protection endorsed by James Madison in Federalist 10, supporting LGB rights even if their constituents do not. To better understand the impact of public opinion in this area, we ask not only if constituent support encourages MCs to vote "yay," but also how much is necessary to receive support from different types of lawmakers.
In the first stage of our analysis, we find that constituent preferences seem to matter a great deal. There is a positive and robust correlation between constituent support and roll-call votes, even after controlling for other influences. Around two-thirds of the roll-call votes in our data are congruent with majority opinion in the MC's home state or district. Digging deeper, however, we find this correlation masks significant and systematic gaps in responsiveness. Votes only appear to respond strongly to constituent preferences for a subset of MCs: white male Democrats. While black Democrats and white female Democrats tend to support LGB rights regardless of their constituents' preferences, the significantly more numerous Republican MCs tend to ignore pro-gay opinion majorities, sticking to their party's national platform positions, producing a large net conservative bias in LGB policymaking. We also find that MCs' positions rarely evolve, even in the presence of significant changes in constituent preferences. In sum, support in roll-call votes requires a large (and likely unachievable) supermajority of public support for many MC; and those MCs who are relatively impervious to gains in public support for LGB rights often constitute a pivotal voting bloc in Congress.
We proceed with a brief discussion of existing literature on responsiveness in the context of gay rights, in Section 2. Section 3 lays out our data and methods, including a new extension to the "MRP" technique that we use for opinion estimation. Section 4 describes basic results and examines vote switching over time. Section 5 presents larger models of voting, and Section 6 provides a deeper analysis over time. We conclude by discussing our results' implications for
LGB policymaking.
Theoretical Foundations
Congress scholars have long argued that MCs' desire for reelection motivates them to consider their constituents' preferences in formulating policy positions (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990) .
Indeed, many studies have uncovered a positive correlation between measures of such preferences and roll-call votes.
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This holds particularly on salient matters (Burstein 1981; Page and Shapiro 1983) and morality policy (Mooney and Lee 1995; Lax and Phillips 2012) . We might then anticipate strong opinion effects on LGB rights issues, akin to Miller and Stokes' (1963) "instructed delegate" model of representation in which MCs know the preferences of the median voter in their home state or district and act accordingly.
Of course, scholars have also shown that the median constituent does not always get his way (Bishin 2000 (Bishin , 2009 Hacker and Pierson 2005, inter alia) . As Fenno (1978) famously argued, the geographic constituency (i.e. state or district) is only one level in a set of concentric circles; within this broad category lies the MC's reelection constituency, primary constituency (i.e. strongest supporters), and personal constituency (i.e. closest allies and advisors). Even if a Republican MC's median constituent supports gay rights, conservative anti-LGB rights advocates may have an influential presence in his reelection, primary, or personal constituency. Indeed, Brady and Schwartz (1995) find that concern about primary election constituencies constrained Republicans' responses to the liberalization of opinion on abortion in the 1970s and 1980s. Bishin (2000) has demonstrated MCs' sensitivity to other kinds of subconstituencies as well, like swing voters and moderate members of the opposing party. Concern about these 1 For seminal work on this issue, see Miller and Stokes 1963. For more recent work, see, e.g., Clinton 2006; Kousser, et al. 2007; Bafumi and Herron 2010; Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2010. subconstituencies could inhibit Democratic MCs' responsiveness to a pro-gay opinion majority.
Republican MCs may also face pressure from party leaders to vote against LGB rights.
Republicans have grown much more conservative in general since the early 1970s (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006) , and opposition to LGB rights has played a significant role in their modern party branding. 2 Since initially staking out divergent positions on LGB rights in their 1992 platforms, the two parties have grown even further apart on these issues. 3 These positions are highly salient to important constituencies within each party's base-for Republicans, religious conservatives, and for Democrats, members of the LGB community and their allies. Lawmakers could also be unaware of opinion change, though this seems unlikely in such a salient issue area. 2 For a helpful review of the increasing importance of LGB issues to the Republican brand, see Bishin and Smith 2013. 3 The 1992 Republican platform opposed the inclusion of sexual preference in federal civil rights statutes, the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, adoption of children by gay and lesbian couples, and open inclusion of gays and lesbians in the military; the Democratic platform called for civil rights protections for gays and lesbians and an end to discrimination in the Defense Department. Over time, the distance between the parties' official positions has grown.
Most existing work on public opinion and government action on LGB rights compares state-level opinion to state policy adoption (e.g., Haider-Markel 2001; Haider-Markel and Kaufman 2006; Lax and Phillips 2009b) . 5 We cannot assume Congress will replicate patterns observed at the state level. On the one hand, Congressional votes are generally more visible to the public than votes in state legislatures, so federal lawmakers may be more sensitive to public preferences. On the other, however, party pressures are probably greater in Congress than in most states. Thus, an analysis at the federal level is needed. This also gives us an opportunity to connect opinion to individual lawmakers' votes, as opposed to system-level outcomes.
The few existing studies of Congressional action on gay rights teach us much but employ coarse measures of constituent preferences and legislative behavior. 6 To capture the former, scholars create indices of pro-gay opinion by averaging constituent preferences across several issues; to capture the latter, they create indices averaging roll-call votes and/or cosponsorships (Lewis and Edelson 2000; Haider-Markel 2001; Oldmixon and Calfano 2007) . This inhibits precise analysis, since surveys consistently document much greater support for some gay rights policies (e.g., protections against employment discrimination) than others (e.g., same-sex marriage). Further, indices of opinion and policy lack a common metric, severely constraining the inferences one can draw. Researchers can show the degree and direction of the correlation between constituent ideology and roll-call voting, but cannot tell whether MCs follow their median constituent, whether policy is over-or under-responsive to opinion, whether opinion or ideology is the key, how responsiveness varies across policies, or whether opinion change results in policy change. Our dyadic analysis overcomes these limitations. Lax and Phillips (2009b) showed that clear supermajority support for some policies failed to spur changes in state law. 6 A notable exception is a paper by Bishin and Smith (2013) , which uses MRP to calculate district level opinion on DOMA. They find that MCs consider opinion generally, and pay particular attention to important subconstituencies, consistent with findings by Bishin (2000 Bishin ( , 2009 ). As TABLE 1 shows, however, public opinion on this set of votes was exceptionally low (on average, 29% of constituents supported same-sex marriage at this time). This still leave us with the question, then, of why MCs have not kept up with the public's liberalization of support for LGB rights. Their findings are suggestive, but a broader analysis of many issues over time is still needed.
Data and Methods
Roll-Call Votes. We evaluate the opinion-vote relationship on 23 roll-call votes across the five issue areas considered by Congress. Some propose liberal changes to the status quo, others conservative. We use survey questions on the issue being voted upon around the time of (almost always before) the vote (see Appendix for data details).
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• Adoption: Two House votes on amendments to the Washington D.C. appropriations bill seeking to prohibit unrelated couples in Washington D.C. from adopting a child (passed in 1998, failed in 1999).
• Same-Sex Marriage: Three proposals. (1) Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman so that the federal government could not recognize same-sex marriages and no state would be required to recognize those from out of state (passed both chambers by wide margins). • Gays in the Military: Four failed votes in 1993 and three successful votes in 2010. Of the failures, two tried to codify a full ban on military service by gays and lesbians, and two aimed to allow the President to decide the issue.
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In 2010, the House voted twice and the Senate once to repeal DADT, the policy prohibiting the military from asking recruits about their sexual orientation, but allowing the military to discharge gay service members.
• Jobs: ENDA sought to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (defeated by one vote in the Senate in 1996, passed the House in 2007). A 1998 effort to defund President Clinton's executive orders prohibiting discrimination in the federal civilian workforce 7 So, if we are considering a 2010 roll-call vote to repeal the military's ban on service by openly gay men and women, we use survey data on this issue from 2010 and 2009. 8 We interpret a "yay" as a vote to allow gays to serve openly in the military, since this was President Clinton's position. failed in the House.
• Hate Crimes: Votes in both chambers in 2000 and 2009 on a proposal to expand existing hate crimes protections to include sexual orientation. In 2000, the measure passed but died in conference committee. In 2009, the bill was signed into law.
Opinion Estimation: Mr. P Goes to Washington. To estimate opinion for each roll-call vote in our analysis, we use multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP). This technique, first presented by Gelman and Little (1997) , uses national surveys and advances in Bayesian statistics and multilevel modeling to generate opinion estimates by demographic-geographic subgroups.
MRP produces accurate estimates of public opinion by state and congressional district using as few data as in a single national survey and fairly simple demographic-geographic models (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006; Phillips 2009a, 2013; Warshaw and Rodden 2012) .
MRP proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate a multilevel model of individual survey response, modeling opinion as a function of a respondent's demographic characteristics as well as her state and (where appropriate and available) her congressional district. Our models use four demographic characteristics: gender, race, age, and education. 9 We also include several state-and district-level variables that should be correlated with support for gay rights. 10 We control for slight differences across polls, which accounts for variation in question wording. We find these predictors explain individual survey responses well.
We then use this model to "predict" opinion for each demographic-geographic type of respondent (e.g., the probability that a black female in New York of age 30-44 with a college degree supports same-sex marriage). Then, the opinion estimates for each demographic-geographic respondent type are weighted (poststratified) by the percentages of each type in actual populations (in either the state or congressional district), to form the total 9 For gender, there are two categories: male and female. For race, there are three categories: black, Hispanic, and white or other. For age, there are four categories: 18-29, 30-44, 45-64, 65+. For education, there are five categories: less than high school, high school degree, some college, college degree, and post-graduate degree.
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State effects are modeled as a function of region, percent African-American, percent Mormon or Christian Evangelical, and percent voting Democratic in the prior presidential election. District effects are modeled similarly in terms of district shares thereof (except for religion data, which is not available), and are grouped by state effect. population percentage. Population frequencies were obtained from the Public Use Micro Data Samples supplied by the Census Bureau. These are converted to congressional district frequencies using the Missouri Census Data Center's Geographic Correspondence Engine (geocorr2k).
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"Cross-Level MRP." One challenge in generating estimates by congressional district is that polling data for some issues do not include district identifiers, preventing the direct use of district-level predictors in the modeling stage even if we have them at the poststratification stage.
One could employ MRP as is, using poststratification by congressional district, with demographic composition still leading to opinion variation. But we find we do better by incorporating additional district-level information, and our modification to MRP allows us to do so. We take the standard district-level response model, but use state-level (as opposed to district-level) values for presidential vote share and the share of the population that is African-American. Then, in the prediction stage, we combine the resulting coefficients on these variables with actual
Congressional district values for presidential vote share and percent black to generate predicted public opinion by district. That is, standard MRP would multiply district-level values of presidential vote by the coefficient on presidential vote measured at the district level, where the unit of analysis is an individual in a district. We cannot do this without a district identifier. But, if we assume the coefficient on presidential vote, say, has the same effect when measured at the aggregate state level as it would when measured at the district level, then we can allow varying presidential vote by district to further capture district opinion variation. Data Summary. TABLE 1 displays summary statistics for our 23 roll-call votes and issue-specific opinion around the time they occurred. Across all votes, our estimates are coded in the pro-gay direction, such that higher values always indicate higher support for gay rights.
Responsiveness and Congruence
If MCs act as instructed delegates on gay rights issues, we should expect their roll-call votes to be both highly responsive to and congruent with constituent preferences. By responsive, we mean there ought to be a strong positive correlation between the level of pro-gay public opinion in an MC's home district or state and the probability that he or she will cast a pro-gay vote. By congruent, we mean that an MC's roll-call vote aligns with majority opinion in his or her home district or state.
Responsiveness. Each graph in FIGURE 2 takes one roll-call vote and plots the probability of an individual legislator casting a vote in favor of LGB rights against our estimates of opinion.
Responsiveness to public opinion is strong if the logit curve is steep and positively sloped. For each of our 23 roll-call votes, the probability of an MC casting a pro-gay vote is indeed positively correlated to the level of public support for gay rights in the MC's home district or state. Bivariate regressions show that the slopes of all of the logit curves are statistically significant at the 95% level, and that the slopes vary across policies.
Congruence. If we look at congruence with majority opinion, however, the opinion-vote relationship appears weaker, and often biased in one direction or the other. Consider the maps of majority opinion and roll-call votes on DADT and ENDA in FIGURE 3. There are far more conservative votes than there are conservative constituencies. We can see this in FIGURE 2 as well. The dotted line extending from the x-axis indicates the 50% opinion level, and the line from the y-axis indicates a 50% pro-gay vote probability. The y-value at which the logit curve intersects the vertical dotted line is the predicted probability of a pro-gay roll-call vote when public support is 50%. The x-value at which the the horizontal dotted line intersects the curve is the needed level of public support for the predicted probability of a pro-gay vote to reach 50%. In a system of perfect majoritarianism, the regression curves would be very steep at 50% opinion and pass through the crosshair in the middle of each graph. This would yield perfect congruence.
For some votes (cf. "FMA2006senate"), the curve comes close to this "majoritarian ideal," but even a cursory glance at FIGURE 2 shows that we do not always observe perfect majoritarianism.
Of course, some degree of incongruence is expected. An MC may not know or care about the difference between 48% and 52% support. Mismatches between opinion and voting near the majority threshold are not necessarily of academic interest either. When large supermajorities are needed to bring about a 50% chance of a pro-gay vote (i.e., if the logit curve is shifted far to the right of the crosshair), however, there are significant biases in policymaking that cannot be explained by uncertainty or dismissed as trivial.
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For example, in the case of "JOBS2007house," constituent opinion needs to be 71% before the MC has a 50% probability of casting a liberal vote. This helps to explain the mismatch between opinion and voting displayed in the maps in FIGURE 3. For "HATE2009house" constituent opinion needs to be 68%. Consequently, congruence for both is relatively low-only 56% for "JOBS2007house" and 59% for "HATE2009house." In contrast, congruence for the 2006 Senate vote on the Federal Marriage Amendment (with a responsiveness curve that passes through the crosshair) is a whopping 80%.
Overall, we find that 68% of the 4,982 terminal roll-call votes in our analysis are congruent with majority opinion.
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By roll-call vote, congruence ranges from 56% to 86%. By issue area, congruence is highest on same-sex marriage (74%) and lowest on hate crimes (61%). On non-civil rights issues, the same concerns would arise about liberal bias (i.e. instances in which the logit curve is shifted far to the left of the crosshair. As Madison articulates in Federalist 10, however, there are legitimate reasons for MCs to ignore majority opinion that would oppress minority rights.
If we only consider roll-call votes where the size of the opinion majority is greater than 60% or 70%, then congruence rises to 78% and 86%, respectively. columns of TABLE 1 show the net liberal vote bias-the number of liberal incongruent votes minus the number of conservative ones. In the House, the greatest benefit the pro-gay side ever received from incongruence amounted to 79 votes ("DADT1993hunterhouse"), while they lost more than 150 votes four times (e.g., "HATE2009house"). These mismatches between opinion and voting are often consequential. Under constituent opinion majorities, four roll-call votes would have flipped in the pro-gay direction ( "FMA2004house," "FMA2006house," "FMA2006senate," and "JOBS1995senate"), and three would have flipped the other way ("DADT1993senate," "DADT1993hunterhouse," and "DCMARRIAGE2010senate").
Differences by Party, Race, and Gender. Now consider "raw" voting records by MC, shown in 14 Party also plays a major role here, as Republican MCs are far less responsive to the liberalization of opinion on LGB rights than Democrats. Two-thirds of Republicans in our sample have never cast a pro-gay roll-call vote, regardless of opinion.
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All together, these results suggest that public opinion "matters" for roll-call voting in a broad sense; however, the success of proposals to extend LGB rights will depend in large part on the composition of Congress.
14 Female Republican MCs are between Democratic and Republican male MCs. See Appendix for graph.
In the Appendix, we show a comparison to MC Nominate score for context. Vote Switching. We can gain even more insight into the role of opinion in the policy process by focusing on MCs who cast multiple votes on the same issues over time, to see if opinion change matters (we might not expect votes to change if opinion has not). There are five issues with roll-call votes in different sessions: adoption (1998, 1999) , "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (1993 , 2010 , the Federal Marriage Amendment (2004, 2006) , hate crimes (2000, 2009) , and employment non-discrimination (1998, 2007) . Since support for gay rights has been steadily increasing over time, we are most interested in studying the extent to which MCs shifted from opposition to support for gay rights. So, we focus on the 687 (of 1,453) pairs in which the first vote was against gay rights. Democrats switched, while only 2 of 55 Republicans did). White male Republicans who started out with an anti-gay vote in an anti-gay district, whose district shifted to being pro-gay, had only a 4% chance of switching to the pro-gay position in the second vote. In contrast, white male Democrats whose districts started out as anti-gay and switched to pro-gay had a 65% chance of switching.
Vote switching is related to opinion, in that switchers saw an 8% increase in pro-gay opinion between votes on average, while non-switchers saw a 1% increase. However, switching is uncommon overall, occurring in only 6.3% of vote pairs (91 switches), and particularly rare amongst Republicans. This striking vote inertia cannot be attributed solely to Republicans, however; almost 40% of the Democrats whose constituents switched from anti-gay to pro-gay failed to follow as well. Uncertainty cannot explain all of this resistance-while some of the points in the graph's top left quadrant are clustered around the 50% mark, many are not (the same is true for the top right quadrant, in which the MCs' constituents supported LGB rights at both times). Thus, some degree of turnover in both parties may be necessary for LGB rights measures to succeed in Congress.
Models of Roll-Call Votes
The dependent variable is whether the roll-call vote cast was pro-gay (liberal). We include indicator variables for Republican, Female, Latino, Black, and Senate. We also include both dimensions of the Poole and Rosenthal measures of MC ideology, DW Nominate 1 and DW Nominate 2. TABLE 2 displays results from eight model variants, to check robustness across specifications (with further notes in the Appendix) and to facilitate various "all else equal" comparisons (so raw coefficients must be interpreted with caution). We allow varying intercepts and slopes for opinion. Party also predicts voting (e.g., Models 2, 4, and 7; in Models 6 and 8, the Republican coefficient is the effect of party after controlling for Nominate score, a strange all-else-equal comparison). Model 4 shows that blacks and Latinos tend to vote pro-gay relative to whites, controlling for opinion (and not controlling for Nominate). Models 5 and 6 show almost no difference between blacks and whites once we control for Nominate, but this is only true on average, as explained later.
Regression results confirm that black MCs are more likely to cast pro-gay votes than white MCs (see the positive, significant coefficient on black in Model 4). These models allow for the effect of opinion to vary by MC type. Additional pro-gay support matters less for black MCs than white MCs, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction with opinion in models 7 and 8. For each additional point of policy-specific opinion (based on Model 7), the probability of a white male Democrat casting a pro-gay vote rises by 5. For white Republicans, the probability only rises by 4, and for black Democrats, it only rises by 3. We also used Model 7 to calculate the level of pro-gay opinion needed for a 50% probability of casting a pro-gay roll-call vote for six types of MCs, ordered from most pro-gay to least (for the average roll call):
The 
Time Trends
The snapshot provided thus far obscures important differences over time, illuminated in FIGURE 6. Reading these panels in order tells the following story: [1] Mean pro-gay opinion increased over time, from around 45% to around 60%. [2] The number of pro-gay opinion majorities increased more sharply, from around 35% to 85%. [3] However, the percentage of pro-gay roll-call votes cast increased far less dramatically, from 50% to 60%. [4] Surprisingly-for now-overall congruence stayed nearly constant (around 70%). [5] and [6] But, the nature of incongruence changed drastically. Incongruence, once leaning to the liberal side, now strongly cuts against pro-gay policy, measured either as a percentage of total incongruence (where the degree of incongruence is incorporated) or by the net vote bias (under +15% to -25%). The predicted conservative vote bias from incongruence now averages 109 votes in the House (i.e., 109 votes are "lost" because MCs are not following constituent opinion) and 25 in the Senate.
Breaking this down by party, FIGURE 7 reveals even more insights. Five of the panels parallel panels in the previous figure, and are labeled [P] to indicate as much. The Rice likeness score is the absolute difference between the percentage of yeas cast by each party, subtracted from 100, revealing the degree of similar pro-gay voting rates between parties. Cohesion is the Rice cohesion score for voting agreement within each party (absolute difference between the yea and nay votes cast within a party) (Rice 1925 (Rice , 1928 . Cohesion has risen and likeness plummeted, a clear display of polarization. Rather than responding to constituent opinion, Republican MCs are sticking with their party's conservative position.
7 Discussion: The Limits of Responsiveness Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas invoked the lack of Congressional action or support for gay rights as evidence that pro-gay attitudes are countermajoritarian and should not be imposed by the Court on the public. This assumes, of course, that legislative action and inaction reflect the will of the people. Despite a degree of responsiveness to opinion, however, we find there is also persistent bias against constituent will on gay and lesbian rights. The anti-gay bias in Congressional roll-call voting is actually countermajoritarian; even majority support is often insufficient for Congress to adopt pro-gay policies. This suggests LGB individuals cannot necessarily rely on the political process to further their rights, and may therefore qualify for the "suspect class" distinction introduced by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products.
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This would require the government to have a compelling interest in any law compromising the rights of LGB individuals, and the law to be narrowly tied to that interest.
Disaggregating MCs by party, gender, and race illuminates important nuances in the opinion-vote relationship that system-level studies, like those conducted at the state level, cannot capture. While Democrats in Congress have steadily increased their support for gay rights as their constituents have liberalized on these issues, Republicans have maintained the same positions against gay rights that they had in the early 1990s, even when there are pro-gay opinion majorities in their districts or states. In other words, increased polarization at the elite level has inhibited responsiveness to the liberalization of opinion on LGB rights. While black MCs and white female Democratic MC generally cast pro-gay votes regardless of their constituents' preferences, they 17 When the courts deal with gay rights issues, they must decide upon a standard of review. In ascending order of rigorousness, the available standards are rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. In order to uphold a facially discriminatory law under the first standard, the Court must find only that there exists a rational basis for the law, and begin with a presumption of constitutionality. On the other hand, strict scrutiny begins with a strong presumption of unconstitutionality: the government must have a compelling interest in the law, and the law must be narrowly tied to that interest. There are two reasons why a Court would apply strict scrutiny: if the state law violates a fundamental right; or if the population affected by the law constitutes a suspect class. In the now famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Justice Stone wrote that prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, such that in those kinds of cases, the Court may need to employ a more rigorous standard. At present, suspect classes include race, religion, and national origin. We do not speak here to the fundamental right basis for strict scrutiny, but can speak to the second basis.
cannot compete with Republican MCs in terms of numbers. All together, these patterns have led to a large partisan gap in responsiveness, and a growing conservative bias in policymaking.
Our findings resist an easy categorization into top-down or bottom-up explanations for policy change. There seems to be a top-down process pushing for gay rights for black and female MCs, and bottom-up pressure from the public affecting many white Democratic MCs. However, our analysis of voting patterns amongst MCs serving long enough to vote on the same issue more than once over time shows that Republican MCs are not the only ones who hold their ground against gay rights even when a majority of their constituents grow supportive-many Democratic MCs fail to switch their votes as well. On the whole, it is clear that persuasion has limitations as a tool for achieving civil rights gains. Looking forward, much will depend on the partisan composition of Congress, and even member replacement amongst Democrats.
While our analysis does not speak directly to the literature on descriptive representation, as openly LGB members of Congress are still too few to study systematically, it raises important questions on the subject. Scholars have long argued that it is important for women and minorities to hold public office because they should be most willing and able to represent people sharing their demographic characteristics (e.g., Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1995; Sapiro 1981; Mansbridge 1999) , and evaluated the extent to which such descriptive representation occurs (e.g., Swers 1998 Swers , 2002 Wangnerud 2009; Harris 2012) . This paper looks more broadly at the extent to which MCs who are members of historically underrepresented populations represent members of other historically underrepresented populations. Our findings suggest that descriptive representation can operate in this broader sense, at least on LGB rights issues; however, this can come at the expense of classic descriptive representation. Like the NAACP, African-American MCs (many of whom represent majority-minority states and districts) have sometimes supported LGB rights over the objections of African-Americans in the electorate. We also need to know more about the power and limitations of public opinion on Congressional roll-call voting in other issue areas. We would like to see more work on dyadic representation, to put our extended case study into context, and additional analyses of critical stoppages in the democratic process. Methodologically, we have extended the reach of the MRP opinion-estimation technique, facilitating this substantive research agenda. Figure 1: Adjusting for Missing Congressional District Identifiers. We take policies that do have congressional district identifiers in the survey data and estimate district opinion using: (1) a standard MRP that makes use of the congressional districts identifiers; (2) an MRP that uses state-level data for presidential vote and percent black in both the response model and in prediction; and (3) an MRP that uses state-level data for presidential vote and percent black in the response model, but district-level values for these variables in the prediction and poststratification phase (our modification). We plot estimates of district-level opinion for three issues using survey data that includes congressional district (cd) identifiers (on the y-axis) against similar estimates that do not make use of these identifiers (on the x-axis). The top panel uses state-level presidential vote and share black in both the response model and prediction phase; the bottom panel uses state-level values of these variables in the response model, but district-level values in the prediction phase. The 45 degree line is shown. Figure 2 : Basic Relationships. Each graph plots the probability of a pro-gay vote from a logistic regression curve (the dark line) given state or district opinion (lighter lines are lowess curves). Each x-and y-axis runs from 0 to 100% for opinion and the probability of a pro-gay vote, respectively. Opinion in states/districts whose MC cast a pro-gay (anti-gay) vote are plotted in a "rug" on the top (bottom) axis. Dotted lines show the 50% marks in opinion and vote probability. Panels are ordered by the position of the curve relative to the 50% crosshair (top to bottom, left to right). Vote Switching Given Initial Anti−Gay Vote Figure 5 : Vote Switching. We plot voting behavior for the 687 pairs of votes by the same legislator on the same issue where the initial vote was anti-gay. Each circle is a Republican, each square a white Democrat, each triangle a black Democrat, filled in when the second vote was pro-gay, and hollow when the second vote was anti-gay. The x-axis shows opinion at time 1 and the y-axis at time 2, with the 45 degree line showing where opinion has not changed. We break the votes into quadrants to show whether opinion at each time was above or below the 50% mark. The fraction switching within each quadrant is shown. 
Opinion versus Ideology
We can see, in contrast to the results for policy-specific opinion, the extent to which ideology predicts pro-gay voting by looking at Figure 9 . This is identical to the opinion figure in the main text, but invokes the first dimension of the Poole and Rosenthal Nominate score instead of opinion.
The top left graph demonstrates a strong relationship between ideology and roll call voting, and this pattern remains even in the party/race subgroups. . The shading captures how pro-gay the voting record was, ranging from light gray (0%) to black (100%). The dashed line shows where the voting record is predicted to be 50% pro-gay, based on OLS regression on opinion and Nominate score, weighted by number of votes cast. Dotted lines to the left and right of it show the 25% and 75% levels respectively.
iii (Appendix) 7. It is difficult to draw inferences relating to race and gender in the "switcher" analysis because almost all female and minority MCs began with pro-gay votes.
Textual Analysis of Floor Speeches
Arguments were sorted into 18 categories: civil rights, constitutionality, equal protection, first amendment, full faith and credit clause, right to privacy, economic interests, equality, federalism, military and national security interests, morality, religious arguments, traditional values, no effect, political posturing, privacy, procedural and technical arguments, and public opinion. FIG-URE 11 displays the percentage of arguments made by Republicans, white Democrats, and black
Democrats invoking civil rights related matters (that is, civil rights, equal protection, or equality). vi (Appendix)
